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Abstract
Memory system reliability is a serious and growing
concern in modern servers. Existing chipkill-level mem-
ory protection mechanisms suffer from several draw-
backs. They activate a large number of chips on ev-
ery memory access – this increases energy consump-
tion, and reduces performance due to the reduction in
rank-level parallelism. Additionally, they increase ac-
cess granularity, resulting in wasted bandwidth in the
absence of sufficient access locality. They also restrict
systems to use narrow-I/O x4 devices, which are known
to be less energy-efficient than the wider x8 DRAM de-
vices. In this paper, we present LOT-ECC, a local-
ized and multi-tiered protection scheme that attempts
to solve these problems. We separate error detection
and error correction functionality, and employ simple
checksum and parity codes effectively to provide strong
fault-tolerance, while simultaneously simplifying imple-
mentation. Data and codes are localized to the same
DRAM row to improve access efficiency. We use sys-
tem firmware to store correction codes in DRAM data
memory and modify the memory controller to handle
data mapping. We thus build an effective fault-tolerance
mechanism that provides strong reliability guarantees,
activates as few chips as possible (reducing power con-
sumption by up to 44.8% and reducing latency by up to
46.9%), and reduces circuit complexity, all while work-
ing with commodity DRAMs and operating systems. Fi-
nally, we propose the novel concept of a heterogeneous
DIMM that enables the extension of LOT-ECC to x16
and wider DRAM parts.
1 Introduction
With shrinking feature sizes and increasing capac-
ity, memory system reliability is a growing concern. In
some datacenter settings, it has been suggested that stor-
age be built entirely out of DRAM memory, and large-
scale systems be created by aggregating the main mem-
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ory of thousands of servers [26]. This places greater
pressure on the memory system to not yield errors.
High-availability servers are typically expected to pro-
vide chipkill-level reliability – the ability to withstand
the failure of an entire DRAM chip. Current commer-
cial chipkill-level reliability mechanisms [10] are based
on conventional symbol-based ECC codes [14]. They
impose various restrictions on system configuration, and
suffer from some combination of the following prob-
lems: (i) wasted energy from activation overfetch, (ii)
wasted memory bus bandwidth and energy due to forced
prefetching, (iii) reduced energy-efficiency due to the
forced use of narrow I/O DRAMs, (iv) lost opportunities
to increase rank-level parallelism, (v) increased storage
overheads, and (vi) increased circuit complexity. Recent
attempts to improve chipkill design [34, 36] have only
partly addressed these problems. There is thus clearly a
need for a fundamentally different approach to provide
efficient chipkill-level fault-tolerance.
Given the memory industry’s hard constraints with
respect to commodity parts in servers, it is essential to
stay fully standards-compliant to even be considered for
commercial adoption. We allow ourselves no leeway
to modify the design of DRAM chips, DIMMs, or the
JEDEC protocol, including burst length, access gran-
ularity, etc. Similarly, the fault-tolerance mechanism
should be completely transparent to the cache hierar-
chy, OS, and applications in order to be implementation
friendly. The only permitted changes are in the mem-
ory controller and system firmware [16]. Also, mem-
ory capacity by itself is affordable, as long as commod-
ity components are used, and some of it can be traded
off for RAS benefits, rather than changing standards or
modifying a multitude of system components [16].
With these requirements and constraints in mind, we
present LOT-ECC, a novel chipkill-level memory reli-
ability mechanism. LOT-ECC employs multiple levels
of localized and tiered error protection. Simple check-
sum and parity codes are deployed effectively to pro-
vide strong levels of fault tolerance while activating the
smallest possible number of chips per memory access.
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All the requisite data mapping and verification is han-
dled by the memory controller with minimal help from
the system firmware, while being completely transpar-
ent to the DRAM devices, OS, caches, TLB, and other
system components. Compared to a modern commercial
chipkill implementation, LOT-ECC saves up to 44.8%
memory power (static + dynamic) and reduces average
memory access latency by up to 46.9%, in addition to a
reduction in ECC circuit complexity, all for a small 14%
additional storage overhead.
2 Background and Related Work
2.1 Existing Commercial Solutions
Current commercial chipkill solutions employ Sin-
gle Symbol Correct Double Symbol Detect (SSC-DSD)
codes [10, 14, 36], which operate on a set of bits (a
“symbol”) rather than individual bits. All errors, of all
lengths, within a single symbol can be corrected. There
are two popular SSC-DSD codes, the eponymous 3-
check-symbol and 4-check-symbol codes [36].
Three check symbols can protect up to 2b − 1 data
symbols, where b is the width of the symbol. With x4
DRAMs, the symbol-width b is 4, the output of each
chip; three ECC chips can therefore protect fifteen data
chips. Being non-power-of-two all around, this results
in granularity mismatches and is inconvenient. The 4-
check-symbol code is therefore preferred, which allows
protection of more data symbols. 32 data symbols are
protected by 4 ECC symbols, creating a 144-bit datapath
from 36 total chips. This is typically implemented as
two ECC DIMMs with 18 chips each, reading/writing
two 64-byte cache lines at a time on a standard DDR3
channel with a burst length of 8.
The x4 chip, 4-check symbol code based designs suf-
fer from several drawbacks, as described below, and
summarized in Table 1. First, ECC codes are com-
puted over large 144-bit data words. This activates a
larger number of chips than absolutely required, increas-
ing overfetch within DRAM chips [15, 20, 32, 34], and
resulting in substantially increased energy consumption.
Area, density, and cost constraints make overfetch in-
evitable to some extent within a rank of chips, but im-
posing additional inefficiency in order to provide fault
tolerance should be avoided. Second, the wide-word re-
quirement results in increased access granularity as burst
lengths increase – a 144-bit bus with the standard DDR3
burst length of 8 already reads/writes two 64-byte cache
lines per access. This forced prefetch potentially wastes
bandwidth and energy unless access locality is consis-
tently high. Third, since a large number of chips is made
busy on every access, there are fewer opportunities for
rank-level parallelism within a given amount of mem-
ory, potentially hurting performance. Bank contention
will likely emerge as a major bottleneck if novel in-
terconnect technologies such as silicon photonics [11,
33] substantially increase the available off-chip mem-
ory bandwidth, making parallelism more important. All
of these problems are exacerbated by the fact that the
structure of the ECC codes forces the use of narrow-
I/O x4 DRAM chips [36]. This increases the number of
DRAM chips needed to achieve a given data bus width,
reducing space on the DIMM for more DRAM chips, de-
creasing the number of independent ranks available [17].
Additionally, for a given capacity, DIMMs with narrow
chips consume more energy than those with wider I/O
chips [28]. Attempts to reduce the access granularity or
move to x8 or x16 DRAM chips results in a significant
increase in storage overhead for the ECC codes [36]. Fi-
nally, symbol-based ECC computation and verification
entails significant circuit complexity due to the involve-
ment of Galois field arithmetic, particularly with wide
symbols such as 8 or 16 bits [27, 36].
With x8 DRAMs, on the other hand, b is 8, allow-
ing just three check symbols to protect as many as 255
data symbols. We consider three protection strategies,
as summarized in Table 1. While it would be most effi-
cient from a storage overhead perspective to use a con-
figuration of 3 ECC chips + 255 data chips, the access
granularity would be unacceptably large. Reducing ac-
cess granularity to a single cache line would require 3
ECC chips + 8 data chips, but storage overhead rises to
37.5%. Reducing storage overhead to 18.75% through a
3 ECC + 16 data configuration ends up reading/writing
two cache lines at a time, in addition to requiring a non-
standard 152-bit channel. The server industry has there-
fore stayed away from x8 DRAMs for chipkill-correct
systems so far. Similar tradeoffs can be made with x16
or wider DRAMs, but at the cost of much sharper in-
creases in either access granularity or storage overhead.
2.2 Virtualized ECC
Virtualized ECC (VECC) [36] is a recent academic
proposal which attempts to provide chipkill-level re-
liability while exploiting the benefits of x8 and x16
DRAMs, without requiring non-standard DIMMs. It
separates error detection and error correction into two
tiers, similar also to other prior work [29, 34, 35]. Fur-
ther, it proposes storing some ECC information (the sec-
ond tier T2EC, responsible for data correction if an error
is detected) in data memory, similar to an earlier pro-
posal for last level caches [35]. However, VECC still
suffers from some significant drawbacks. It continues to
use conventional symbol-based ECC codes, inheriting
all of their constraints with respect to DIMM/rank orga-
nization and access granularity. First, it requires 144-
bit channels, which was not a problem in the original
paper since it evaluated a DDR2 channel with a burst
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2 12.5% Overfetch, forced prefetching, reduced rank-level
parallelism, GF arithmetic, x4 restriction
SSC-DSD x8, 3-check
symbol code, Option 1
2040b data +
24b ECC
31 1.17% Significant overfetch, non-power-of-2 data length, forced
prefetching, non-standard channel width, GF arithmetic
SSC-DSD x8, 3-check
symbol code, Option 2
64b data +
24b ECC
1 37.5% Significant storage overhead, non-standard 88-bit channel,
GF arithmetic
SSC-DSD x8, 3-check
symbol code, Option 3
128b data +
24b ECC
2 18.75% Overfetch, forced prefetching, reduced parallelism,
non-standard 152-bit channel, GF arithmetic
VECC x8, 3-check symbol
code, 1 symbol virtualized
128b data +
16b ECC
2Rd/4Wr 18.75% Overfetch, forced prefetching (both even worse for writes),
performance impact due to writes, reduced parallelism, GF
arithmetic, modifies various system components
SSA x8, checksum+parity 64b data +
8b ECC
1 25% Increased storage overhead, performance impact due to






1 26.5% Increased storage overhead
length of 4 – every access is only 144*4 bits, a single
64-byte cache line. However, most servers today use
DDR3 channels, with a minimum burst length of 8, forc-
ing prefetch. Half-burst accesses (length = 4) are possi-
ble in DDR3, but this simply masks out the last four
bursts – no transfer occurs, and half the bandwidth is
wasted. Second, 18 x8 chips are made busy on each ac-
cess (twice the minimum required), increasing overfetch
and reducing rank-level/bank-level parallelism. Third,
these problems are exacerbated for memory write oper-
ations. Specifically, the data mapping adopted by VECC
leaves open the possibility of the T2EC being placed
in a failed DRAM chip if a single rank is used. It
therefore forces the T2EC code to be placed in a dif-
ferent rank (also 18 x8 chips), thus raising the number
of chips touched when writing to memory to 36. It also
means that we can only tolerate failure in at most 1 in
36 DRAM chips. Finally, VECC requires modifications
to several components of the system, including the op-
erating system, memory management unit, caches, etc.,
making it difficult to implement.
2.3 Single Subarray Access (SSA)
Another recent proposal to improve chipkill design is
SSA [34]. It was able to reduce access granularity to just
9 x8 DRAM chips and one cache line, at a tolerable stor-
age overhead of 25%. However, it was specifically tar-
geted at a novel DRAM microarchitecture (Single Sub-
array Access, SSA) also proposed in the same paper, and
required cache lines to be localized to a single DRAM
chip unlike commodity architectures. It exploited cer-
tain RAS features built into the microarchitecture, such
as additional space in each row to store local ECC infor-
mation. Also, it suffered from non-trivial penalties dur-
ing write operations since some ECC information com-
puted across several different cache lines had to be up-
dated every time any of those lines was written to.
2.4 Other Related Work
Memory reliability has received increased atten-
tion from the architecture community in recent years.
Schroeder et al. studied DRAM failures in large-scale
datacenters at Google [30]. The Rochester Memory
Hardware Error Project [22] characterized failures not
just at a platform level, but went right down to individual
bits. Both papers highlighted the importance of memory
errors going forward, but did not propose novel reliabil-
ity mechnisms. Papers on novel memory architectures
such as Mini-Rank [37] and MC-DIMM [9] have in-
cluded discussions on their impact on ECC and/or chip-
kill, but have not proposed any fundamental changes.
Key Differentiators: LOT-ECC solves most of the prob-
lems discussed above. It works with just a single rank
of nine x8 chips, improving access granularity, energy
consumption, and performance. Also, both commercial
designs and VECC define chipkill as the failure of 1 chip
out of 36, whereas LOT-ECC supports 1 dead chip in
9, a significant boost in reliability guarantee. As with
prior designs, the target fault model is the failure of one
entire chip, and the detection of failures in at least 2
chips. Finally, LOT-ECC is transparent to everything
but the memory controller and the firmware, making it
less invasive, and more implementation friendly. LOT-
ECC pays for this reduction in energy,improvement in
performance, and simplicity through a slight increase in
storage overhead for the ECC codes – a total of 26.5%
(both tiers together), compared to 18.75% with VECC
and 12.5% with commercial SSC-DSD.
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3 Proposal: LOT-ECC Design
LOT-ECC takes a novel, fundamentally different ap-
proach to reliability. It splits protection into multiple
tiers to detect errors, isolate their location, and recon-
struct the erroneous data, and maps all data and codes
into the same row-buffer to allow efficient access.
3.1 Local Error Detection (LED)
The first layer of protection afforded by LOT-ECC is
local error detection (LED). The function of this code
is to perform an immediate check following every read
operation to verify data fidelity. Additionally, it needs
to identify the exact location of the failure, at a chip-
granularity within a rank. To ensure such chip-level de-
tection (required for chipkill), the LED information it-
self needs to be maintained at the chip level – associated
not with each cache line as a whole (as in symbol-based
ECC codes), but with every cache line “segment”, the
fraction of the line present in a single chip in the rank.
In Figure 1, for example, cache line A is divided into
segmentsA0 throughA8. The corresponding local error
detection codes are LA0 through LA8.
Data Layout: Consider a standard ECC rank with nine
x8 DRAMs, and a burst length of 8, as shown in Fig-
ure 1. Instead of treating this as eight data chips and
one ECC chip, we propose storing both data and LED
information on all nine chips. Since we need 512 data
bits (one cache line) in total, each chip will have to pro-
vide 57 bits towards the cache line. An x8 chip supplies
64 bits per access, which are interpreted as 57 bits of
data (A0 in Figure 1, for example), and 7 bits of LED
information for those 57 bits (LA0). Across 9 chips, this
translates to 513 bits of data and 63 bits of LED. Since
a cache line is only 512 bits, there is one surplus bit,
which we will utilize as part of the second layer of pro-
tection (Section 3.2. At this point, simply note that the
7-bit LED detects errors in 57 bits of data – code details
follow in Section 3.5.
Impact on Memory Reads and Writes: There are no
performance penalties on either reads or writes due to
the LED layer. Every cache line access also reads/writes
its corresponding LED information. Since the LED is
“self-contained”, i.e., it is constructed from bits belong-
ing to exactly one cache line, no read-before-write is re-
quired – all bits required to build the code are already at
the memory controller before a write.
3.2 Global Error Correction (GEC)
The function of the Layer 2 Global Error Correction
code is to aid in the recovery of lost data once the Layer
1 code detects an error and indicates its location. The
Layer 2 GEC is itself decomposed into three tiers. The
primary component is a 57-bit entity that is a column-
wise XOR parity of the nine cache line segments, each
a 57-bit field from the data region. For cache line A, for
example, its GEC parity PA is a XOR of data segments
A0, A1, .., A8. Data reconstruction from the GEC code
is trivial (a simple XOR of the error-free segments and
the GEC code) since the LED has already flagged the
erroneous chip. Since there isn’t an additional dedicated
ECC chip (we used up the one provided to store data +
LED), the GEC code has to be stored in data memory
itself. The memory is made to appear smaller than it
physically is by the firmware. The memory controller is
also aware of this change, and maps data accordingly.
Data Layout: In line with our objective to provide
strong fault-tolerance of 1 dead chip in 9, and to min-
imize the number of chips touched on each access, we
choose to place the GEC code in the same rank as its
corresponding cache line, unlike prior proposals [36].
We set apart a specially-reserved region (shaded red
in Figure 1) in each of the 9 chips in the rank for this
purpose. This is a subset of cache lines in every DRAM
page (row), although it is shown as a distinct set of rows
in Figure 1 for clarity. This co-location ensures that
reads or writes to the GEC information will be guar-
anteed to be a row-buffer hits when made in conjunc-
tion with the read or write to the actual data cache line,
thus reducing its performance impact. With this new
data-mapping, a 9 KB row buffer can only accommo-
date 8 KB of data+LED; the rest is used to store the GEC
codes for that 8 KB. This requires some basic arithmetic
circuitry at the memory controller to appropriately cal-
culate the row-id for each physical page.
Figure 2 shows the way the GEC information is laid
out in the reserved region, for an example cache line A.
Similar to the data bits, the 57-bit parity PA is itself dis-
tributed among all 9 chips. The first seven bits of the PA
field (PA0−6) are stored in the first chip, the next seven
bits (PA7−13) are stored in the second chip, and so on.
Bits PA49−55 are stored on the eighth chip. The last
bit, PA56 is stored on the ninth chip, in the surplus bit
borrowed from the Data+LED region (see Section 3.1).
The failure of a chip also results in the loss of the cor-
responding bits in the GEC region. The GEC code PA
itself, therefore, is protected by an additional parity, the
third tier PPA. PPA is a 7-bit field, and is the XOR of
eight other 7-bit fields, PA0−6, PA7−13, .., PA49−55.
The PPA field is stored on the ninth chip. If an en-
tire chip fails, the GEC is first recovered using this par-
ity combined with uncorrupted GEC segments from the
other chips (we know which chips are uncorrupted since
the LED indicates the failed chip). The full GEC is then
used to reconstruct the original data.
Next, consider the case where in addition to a fully
failed chip, there is an error in a second chip – we still
need to be able to detect, if not correct, such a failure
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Figure 2. Data layout for one cache line’s GEC in the red-shaded GEC region
under our fault model. If this second error is also a
full-chip failure, it will be detected by the LED along
with the initial data read, and flagged as an uncorrectable
double-chip failure. On the other hand, if this second er-
ror occurs just in the GEC region of interest, it needs to
be detected during the GEC phase.
For example, assume that the second chip has com-
pletely failed – we have now lost A1, and PA7−13. If,
in addition, there is an error in the GEC region of the
first chip, there is a possibility that one or more of the
bits PA0−6 are corrupt. The reconstruction of lost bits
PA7−13 from PPA and PA0−6, PA14−20, PA21−27,
.., PA56 may itself be incorrect. To handle this prob-
lem, we use the remaining 9 bits (marked T 4, for Tier-4,
in Figure 2) to build an error detection code across GEC
bits PA0 through PA55, and PPA. Note that neither
exact error location information nor correction capabili-
ties are required at this stage since the reliability target is
only to detect a second error, and not necessarily correct
it. We can therefore build a code using various permu-
tations of bits from the different chips to form each of
the T 4 bits. This should include multiple bits from the
same chip, and bits from different columns across chips
to maximize the probability of detection.
We will now work through examples of various
failure possibilities, and illustrate LOT-ECC operation.
Again, consider a single cache line A. Recall that chips
0-7 (without loss of generality) contain 57 bits of data
plus 7 bits of LED in the data region, and 7 bits of GEC
parity plus 1 bit of T4 information in the GEC region.
Chip-8 contains 56 bits of data plus 7 bits of LED in the
data region, and 8 bits of parity (including the surplus
bit borrowed from the data region) plus one bit of T4
information in the GEC region.
If one of the first eight chips, say chip-1, fails, 57 bits
of data (A1) are lost, in addition to GEC parity infor-
mation PA7−13. We first read A0 - A8, and the LED
associated with A1 (LA1), indicates a chip error. We
then read GEC segments PA0−6, PA14−20, PA21−27,
.., PA49−55, PA56and PPA to recover the lost GEC bits
PA7−13, thereby reconstructing GEC parity PA. Com-
bined with values A0 and A2 - A7, data value A1 can be
reconstructed, thus recovering the entire original cache
line. If, on the other hand, the ninth were to fail, only
56 bits of data are lost (A8), in addition to PPA, and
the surplus bit PA56. The lost 56 bits can be recovered
simply from the 56 bits of parity stored in the first eight
chips (PA0−55), and clean segments A0 - A7. The loss
of surplus bit PA56 is immaterial. Across these cases,
the fidelity of the GEC parity bits themselves is guaran-
teed by T 4.
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Impact on Memory Reads and Writes: Read opera-
tions do not need to access GEC information unless an
error is detected, which is a rare event. GEC, therefore,
has no significant impact on reads. Write operations, on
the other hand, need to update the GEC (which includes
PX , PPX , and T 4) when any data is modified. In a
basic implementation, each cache line write gets trans-
formed into two writes – one to the data location (for a
full 576 bits of data+LED+surplus bit) and another to its
corresponding GEC location (72-bits). We minimize the
performance impact of this additional write by mapping
data and GEC to the same DRAM row, guaranteeing a
row-buffer hit. This trick is similar to Loh and Hill’s op-
timization to store tag and data for a cache line in the
same row in a large DRAM cache [23]. Additionally,
note that there isn’t a need for a read-before-write of the
data cache lines themselves as in some earlier propos-
als [34], since all bits contributing to the GEC code are
from a single cache line, already available at the con-
troller. This also helps keep performance impact low.
Although only 72 bits of GEC+T4 code need to be
updated per write, we are forced by the DDR3 proto-
col to complete a burst of 8 per access (an entire 72-
byte “cache line” size of data). We could, therefore, po-
tentially combine as many as 8 different GEC updates
into a single write command, minimizing performance
impact further. This is low-overhead since writes are
already buffered and streamed out intermittently from
the memory controller to avoid frequent bus turnaround.
Additional logic can easily be implemented to coalesce
as many GEC writes as possible. Every write is trans-
formed into 1 + δ writes (δ ≤ 1) depending on the ap-
plication’s access characteristics and the write-buffering
policies. δ = 1 in a non-coalesced basic LOT-ECC
implementation, and 0.125 in an oracular design since
eight GEC words fit in a single “cache line”, and could
potentially be coalesced into a single write. The val-
ues of δ for the PARSEC [12] benchmark workloads
are shown in Figure 3 (details on methodology follow
in Section 4). Note that for the purposes of this paper,
we employ a very rudimentary coalescing scheme where
the “window” we look into to find suitable writes to co-
alesce is simply the set of writes that are sent out by
default each time the bus is turned around for a “write
burst”. More complicated schemes that may selectively
buffer writes for longer in an effort reduce δ are certainly
possible – we leave such optimizations to future work.
If complete coalescing is not possible (based on the
addresses being written to), data masking [18] can be
employed to only write the appropriate bits into mem-
ory. Note that the complete burst of 8 has to performed
nonetheless – some pieces of data are just masked out
while actually writing to DRAM.
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3.3 Storage Costs of LOT-ECC
For each 64-byte cache line, LOT-ECC requires the
following ECC bits: (1) 63 bits of LED information, at
7 bits per chip, (2) 57 bits of GEC parity, spread across
the nine chips, (3) 7 bits of third-level parity, PPX , and
(4) 9 bits of T 4 protection, 1 bit per chip. This adds
up to a total of 136 bits, a storage overhead of 26.5%.
Out of this 26.5%, 12.5% is provided by the 9th chip on
standard ECC DIMMs, and the other 14% is stored in
data memory.
3.4 LOT-ECC with Wide-I/O DRAMs
Wider-I/O DRAM parts are favored over narrower
DRAMs since they are typically more power effi-
cient [36] and enable greater rank-level parallelism. To
enable their widespread adoption, there is a need to de-
velop efficient reliability mechanisms that work with
such configurations. However, there are several un-
knowns regarding the use x16 and x32 DRAMs in fu-
ture commodity DIMMs – data bus width increases or
the provisioning of additional chips for ECC support,
for example. We therefore present a brief discussion of
LOT-ECC implementation under a few possible scenar-
ios, and propose the concept of heterogeneous DIMMs
to address some concerns with these options. For clarity,
we only quantify overheads with x16 DRAMs; similar
ideas can be extended to x32 DRAMs and beyond. The
options are summarized in Table 2.
Option 1 - Wide Memory Channels: If the natural pro-
gression of memory system design is to simply increase
the channel width as wider-I/O DRAMs become com-
mon, LOT-ECC can be implemented with little mod-
ification. For instance, consider a rank of nine x16
DRAMs. The 128 bits supplied by an x16 DRAM in
a burst of 8 would simply be interpreted as 114 data bits
and 14 checksum LED bits, the same storage overhead
as with x8 DRAMs. GEC operation remains unchanged.
There is necessarily an increase in access granularity and
overfetch, independent of LOT-ECC. This will also dou-
ble with the further doubling of I/O width to x32 or x64.









































































































































































































(b) Xeon 5500 based system
Figure 3. Quantification of GEC coalescing opportunity
Option 2 - Increasing Storage Overhead: If access
granularity is fixed at exactly one cache line, the min-
imum rank size with x16 chips is 5 chips,4 data and 1
ECC. Each chip provides 128 bits per burst of 8, inter-
preted as 103 data bits (since 103 * 5 chips = 512-bit
cache line). This leaves 25 bits per chip to store the LED
code, which provides very strong error protection, but is
likely overkill and wasteful of storage area (the over-
head is 24.3%). GEC overhead increases as well, since
the global parity is a 103-bit entity computed over five
103-bit data segments. After including storage for T3
and T4, the total overhead is about 50%.
Option 3 - Optimizing Storage Overhead: If storage
overhead is an important consideration, it can be fixed at
about 12.5%, paying for it through an increase in access
granularity. With x16 chips and a 5-chip rank, for ex-
ample, 9 reads can be issued consecutively, reading out
a total of 80 bits per cycle * burst of 8 cycles * 9 ac-
cesses = 5,760 bits. This results in a very large access
granularity of 10 cache lines (5120 bits) plus their LED
codes, a storage overhead of 12.5%. The GEC overhead
remains approximately 25%, similar to Option 2, for an
overall ECC storage overhead of about 37.5%. There
may also be some forced prefetching since a single burst
also partly reads bits from a second cache line.
Heterogeneous DRAMs within a Rank: If neither
access granularity nor storage overhead can be com-
promised, but there is freedom to implement a custom
DIMM, we propose a novel third option – the use of het-
erogeneous DRAMs within a single DIMM rank. In this
case, minimum access granularity can be maintained
while still retaining a 12.5% storage overhead. With x16
parts, for instance, a minimum-sized rank would be four
x16 DRAMs plus one x8 DRAM (note that the DRAMs
are still commodity, just not the DIMM), providing a
DIMM width of 72 bits. With a burst length of 8, each
x16 DRAM supplies 128 bits and the x8 DRAM sup-
plies 64 bits. These should be interpreted as (114 data +
14 LED) and (56 data + 8 LED) respectively. There is
no change to GEC overhead or operation.
Conclusion: It is clear that there are several knobs avail-
able to turn – the storage overhead, the importance of
access granularity (typically a function of access locality
in the workload), the willingness to build heterogeneous
DIMMs – as wide I/O parts such as x16 or x32 become
mainstream due to their reduced power consumption.
LOT-ECC is flexible enough to be effective in designs
with varying combinations of these knobs.
3.5 DRAM Errors and LED Checksum
The target of the LED code (Section 3.1) is to detect
errors in 57 bits of data through the use of a 7 bit check-
sum. The 57 bits of data are divided into 8 blocks of 7
bits each. The last bit is padded with 6 zeros to make
it a 7-bit value. A 7-bit checksum is produced by per-
forming an integer one’s complement addition of these
nine blocks. The carry-out information of the MSB is
preserved via being wrapped around and added back to
the LSB, improving error detection capability. We re-
fer the reader to Maxino [24] for further details on the
operation of checksums.
Prior work has shown that DRAM errors occur in a
few major ways – single-bit error, double-bit error, row-
failure, column-failure, row-column failure, pin failure,
and full chip-failure [13, 21, 22, 31]. We consider each
of these in turn, and show how the proposed LED check-
sum handles error detection. Table 3.5 summarizes both
the raw FIT1 and the effective FIT, i.e., the failure rate
with a fault tolerance mechanism in place.
Single-bit error: This is among the most common fail-
ure modes in DRAM, and can be either due to a soft-
error or a hard-error. Any checksum is guaranteed to
detect this kind of error.
Double-bit error: These are defects that span two near-
est neighbor memory cells and are not the coincidence
of two independent single bit errors [31]. Adjacent bits
11 FIT, or Failure In Time, is the when 1 failure is likely in 1 billion
hours of operation.
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Single-bit soft 5000 [21] 0 0 0
Single-bit hard 12.6 [31] 0 0 0
Double-bit 0.7 [31] 0 0 0
Row 6.3 [31] 0 0 6.3
Pin 4.1 [31] 0 0 0
Row-Column 4.2 [21] 0 0 4.2














- 0 0.19 >0
Failure of 2 chips in
18, errors in >2
chips per rank, etc.
-
>0 0 >0
Soft errors will likely be caught by patrol scrubbers, and
will rarely occur in conjunction with other errors
will fall into adjacent checksum-columns2, only flipping
a single bit in each column. This will alter the checksum
value, flagging the error.
Row-failure: These are caused by a failure of one of
the chip’s row drivers, causing all cells in one row of
the affected chip to fail. We employ bit inversion in the
checksum computation so that such stuck-at faults are
detected [34]. With this in place, the checksum detects
an entire row incorrectly being either all 0 or all 1.
Column-failure: These are caused by the failure of a
senseamp in an array, making the entire column of bits
unreadable. For a given request, this is equivalent to a
single-bit failure, and can be detected by the checksum.
Row-column failure: This error occurs when an inter-
secting row and column fail. It does not require any
special handling beyond a simple row or column error
depending on the data being accessed.
Pin-failure: This error occurs when a data-pin (DQ)
gets stuck at 0 or 1. It might also be caused by a failure
of one of the column senseamps or column decoders,
with similar effects as a failed pin. With the proposed
LED mechanism, since each block is 7 bits, and each
pin outputs 8 bits per access, there is a “wrap-around”
that occurs naturally. This means that the eight poten-
2the set of bits that line up vertically for addition during the check-
sum generation process
tially erroneous bits coming from the failed pin fall into
distinct checksum-columns, with the exception of the
last bit. Since we employ an addition-based checksum
(rather than XOR based), the presence of the carry-bit
protects against the simultaneous inversion of those two
overlapping bits; note that the undetectable combination
of 0 to 1 flip in one bit and 1 to 0 flip in the other cannot
occur with stuck-at faults.
Chip-failure: For a given cache line, handling a chip er-
ror is conceptually equivalent to handling a row failure,
and the same arguments with regard to error detection
hold good. The difference lies primarily in post-error
service operation. With a row error, there is a possi-
bility of re-mapping the data from the failed row (upon
reconstruction) into one of several spare rows typically
provisioned on DRAM chips, called Memory Page Re-
tire [31]. With an entire chip failure, the DIMM is im-
mediately flagged for replacement.
Multiple random bit errors: Addition-based check-
sums are susceptible to silent data corruption if an even
number of bits in a given checksum-column flip. In our
LED checksum, Column 0, for example, consists of bits
0, 7, 14, 21, 28, 35, 42, 49, and 57 from a single row.
Since there is 6-bit gap between the closest two bits, it is
highly unlikely that the same failure “cause” (other than
a row or column failure), such as a soft-error strike, can
result in such bit flips. This means that the two have to
be independent single-bit events. Since each error is al-
ready rare in general, the probability of a combination
of errors affecting the same data word in the same lo-
cality is extremely low [22]. To quantify, consider the
12.6 FIT number for a single-bit hard error. If a single
DRAM has 16 M cache line segments, the probability of
an error in a given segment during a billion hour period
is 12.6 / 16 M, which is 7.51E-7 – this is the segment
FIT. The probability of two independent errors affect-
ing the same segment is therefore 5.64E-13 per billion
hours. With each segment being 64 bits, the probability
that the two erroneous bits are among the nine bits 0, 7,
14, 21, 28, 35, 42, 49, and 57 is (9C2)/(64C2). Since
errors can occur in any of the 7 checksum-columns, we
multiply this value by 7, giving 0.125. The probability
of a two bits flipping in a way that is undetected is, there-
fore, 5.64E-13 * 0.125, which is just 7E-14. Finally, this
can occur in any of 16 M segments, giving an overall
undetectable FIT of 1.1E-6. Next, consider the com-
bination of a single-hit hard error and a single-bit soft
error. Calculations similar to the one above indicate an
undetectable FIT of 4.7E-4. Finally, consider the case of
two soft errors. Modern servers typically employ some
form of patrol scrubbing which periodically corrects any
soft errors in the array. It is therefore unlikely that two
soft errors will occur in the same row leading to an unde-
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tectable error. Even worst-case calculations for a system
with no scrubbing, and a pessimistic assumption of 5000
FIT for soft errors [21] results in an undetected error rate
of 0.19 FIT. The odds of 4 or 6 or 8 independent random
errors all affecting the same segment are even smaller.
Combination Errors: Even when the individual raw
FIT of a fault is as high as 5000 (as with the single-bit
soft error), we showed that the probability of multiple si-
multaneous occurrences leading to silent data corruption
is extremely small. This is even more true for other com-
binations such as multiple column decoder/senseamp
failures on the same data word, or a sensamp failure
plus a single-bit soft error, etc., since their individual
raw FITs are already orders of magnitude smaller than
5000. Such combination errors, therefore, will have a
negligible impact on overall reliability levels.
Discussion: Existing commercial chipkill mechanisms
formally guarantee catching any and all possible com-
binations of bit flips within a chip, paying significant
power and performance penalties to guard against ob-
scure bit-flip combinations that occur rarely, if ever.
However, field studies indicate that DRAM errors typ-
ically fall under a very small number of failure modes
with specific root causes. LOT-ECC is cognizant of
these, and captures all commonly occurring faults, while
providing substantial power and performance benefits.
Additionally, LOT-ECC captures some failure scenarios
that current mechanisms cannot. Examples include the
failure of 2 chips in 18, the simultaneous occurance of a
single chip failure and single bit errors in all other chips,
etc.
Given the significant power/performance overheads
of fault-tolerance, the burden of memory reliability will
likely not be foisted solely upon ultra-robust catch-all
ECC codes, especially considering trends such as rising
burst lengths, wider chip I/Os, and increasing system
capacities. Strong yet practical fault-tolerance codes,
combined with RAS features such as patrol scrub-
bing [1], spare-row mapping, bit steering, memory page
retire [31], will provide the best power-performance-
reliability tradeoff at the system level. These will likely
“cure” a majority of faults before they deteriorate into
undetectable errors.
4 Benefits and Results
4.1 Methodology
Performance Studies: To study the performance
characteristics of our designs, we use a detailed
in-house DRAM simulator. We accurately model
refresh overheads, address/command bus, data bus,
bank/rank/channel contention, and the memory con-
troller queue. We also model a separate write-queue that
holds write operations (and the associated GEC writes)
as they come in to the memory controller, and issues
them in bursts to amortize bus-turnaround overheads.
We use close-page row-buffer management with a sim-
ple FCFS policy, since the access pattern has little im-
pact on the operation of LOT-ECC. Close-page policies
are the norm today for industry standard servers from
all major vendors in an effort to improve performance in
typical workloads with relatively low locality [8, 19, 25].
The one exception we make is for write operations –
the data line and GEC lines (coalesced or otherwise) are
guaranteed to be co-located in a single row buffer, mak-
ing a semi-open-page policy beneficial. We adopt the
baseline address mapping policy from Jacob et al. [17].
DRAM timing parameters were obtained from Micron
DDR3 datasheets. We employ a synthetic traffic gener-
ator with a tunable rate of traffic injection, and a tunable
fraction of write operations for a majority of our exper-
iments. We use the PARSEC [12] benchmarks to evalu-
ate the GEC coalescing scheme.
Power Calculation: To accurately calculate memory
power consumption, we directly use Micron’s DDR3
power calculator spreadsheet [6]. The spreadsheets re-
quire inputs regarding bus utilization, bank utilization,
etc., which we obtain from our performance simulation.
The calculator accounts for activation power, read/write
power, termination power, and background power. It
also incorporates support for low-power modes, which
we assume are oracularly applied whenever all banks
are idle. We measure power when the system is under
heavy load, with traffic just below the system’s satura-
tion point, as determined by our performance studies.
Target System Configurations: We evaluate our de-
signs on memory systems based on two contemporary
high-end server processors from Intel. The same ba-
sic controller/channel/DIMM organization and reliabil-
ity mechanisms are used by all major server vendors.
First, we consider Xeon 7500 based systems [3, 4, 7],
with a typical configuration as shown in Table 4.1. All
Xeon 7500 based servers mandatorily implement Lock-
step Mode in the memory system. This gangs two x72
ECC-DIMMs and channels together to form a 144 bit
bus, essential for today’s reliability mechanisms.
Second, we consider Xeon 5500 based systems [2,
5], with a typical configuration as shown in Table 4.1.
Since these processors have an odd-number of channels
(three, in this case), the effect of lockstep mode is pro-
nounced. While the processor does allow operation in
non-lockstep mode if strong reliability is not desired,
chipkill mode simply leaves one channel empty, and
gangs the other two together. This results in a signifi-
cant performance hit. Note that design decisions leading
to an odd number of channels are a result of complex
interplay between pin availability, expected bandwidth
demand based on target workloads and processor horse-
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Table 4. Main Memory Configuration




Ranks/DIMM 2 for x4; 4 for x8 2 for x4, 4 for x8
Banks/Rank 8 8
Capacity 128 GB 72 GB
power, re-use of designs for varying market segments
(desktops, laptops, and servers), etc. It is therefore cer-
tainly possible that such designs will continue to exist in
future commercial processors, despite the large impact
on power and performance for reliability.
Reliability Models Evaluated: Our baseline model is
a modern commercial Single Symbol Correct Double
Symbol Detect (SSC-DSD) design, as described in Sec-
tion 2. This is currently supported only with x4 DRAMs.
Additionally, it requires the use of lockstep-mode opera-
tion. Our second baseline is VECC [36], which enables
the use of x8 DRAMs in lockstep mode, while suffer-
ing a small write-penalty. We obtain the T2EC cache
miss rate, i.e., the fraction of writes that require an ad-
ditional “redundant information write”, from the origi-
nal paper, and include it in our simulator – the VECC
model is therefore an optimized baseline, accounting for
T2EC caching. We also optimistically assume that all
the hardware/software support mechanisms required to
make VECC work happen oracularly with no perfor-
mance or power impact. We first evaluate the basic LOT-
ECC design, which allows us to upgrade to x8 DIMMs,
without the use of lockstep mode. In this mode, ev-
ery write is transformed into two writes – one data and
one GEC. We then show the benefits of coalescing GEC
writes to reduce their performance impact. Finally, we
show an oracular design with perfect coalescing, where
only one in eight writes suffers from the overhead of an
additional GEC write.
4.2 Power Savings
LOT-ECC provides substantial power savings com-
pared to traditional chipkill mechanisms, through a re-
duction of both dynamic and static power.
Dynamic power: Commercial chipkill solutions touch
thirty-six x4 chips both to read and write [10].
VECC [36] activates eighteen x8 chips per read and
thirty-six x8 chips per write (data + T2EC). LOT-ECC,
on the other hand, activates the absolute minimum num-
ber required, just nine x8 chips (writes may require an
additional row-buffer access to the same chips). This
change in activation granularity results in a reduction
in dynamic energy consumption. LOT-ECC also elim-
inates forced prefetching, since only one 64-byte cache-






























































































Figure 5. Power in Xeon 5500 systems
Static power: LOT-ECC reduces the footprint of each
activation, allowing unused rank/banks to transition into
low-power modes. For our evaluation, we only employ
the shallow low-power modes that can be entered into
and exited from quickly.
The combined power consumption is shown in Fig-
ures 4 and 5. In the Xeon 7500-based system, LOT-ECC
reduces power consumption by 43.1% compared to the
SSC-DSD baseline. Reducing the number of writes to
GEC locations through GEC coalescing increases the
savings to 44.8%, based on average δ from Figure 3.
With an oracular coalescer, savings can potentially in-
crease to 47.4%. The trends are similar with 5500-
based systems, although the power savings are some-
what lower. This is because some of the savings are
offset by increased static power consumption due to the
increased number of DIMMs made possible when LOT-
ECC relaxes the lockstep mode constraint and popu-
lates the third channel. Power savings with respect to
the SSC-DSD baseline are 31.9% with basic LOT-ECC,
32.9% with GEC coalescing, and 38.3% with oracular
GEC coalescing. VECC’s energy consumption lies be-
tween those of SSC-DSD and LOT-ECC; we confirm
that VECC’s power savings compared to the SSC-DSD
baseline are in line with numbers reported in the original
paper. Compared to this baseline, LOT-ECC with coa-
lescing reduces power consumption by 24.6% in 7500-
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Figure 7. Latency in Xeon 5500 systems
4.3 Performance Gains
In addition to the large energy advantage, reducing
access granularity also has a small positive effect on per-
formance. For a given total number of chips in the sys-
tem, there is increased rank-level parallelism. This re-
duces bank conflicts and reduces overall average mem-
ory access latency. A fraction of this gain is lost due
to the the extra writes to GEC lines required along with
the regular writes. Despite this overhead, LOT-ECC still
comes out ahead, even without coalescing.
Figures 6 and 7 shows the average memory access la-
tency as a function of traffic. With the 7500-based sys-
tem, at a traffic rate of 1 request per 40 cycles (just under
saturation), the basic implementation of LOT-ECC x8
provides 4.6% latency reduction compared to the SSC-
DSD baseline. GEC coalescing further enhances the im-
provement to 7.7%, with an oracular policy providing a
maximum of 16.2% reduction in latency. Latency re-
ductions are much more substantial in the 5500-based
system, since LOT-ECC relaxes the lockstep-mode con-
straint, providing substantially increased channel band-
width. At a traffic rate of 70 (SSC-DSD in lockstep
mode saturates soon after), latency reductions are 42.9%
with LOT-ECC x8, 46.9% with GEC coalescing, and
an oracular maximum of 57.3%. VECC actually per-
forms marginally worse than the SSC-DSD baseline
(confirming the results in the original paper). Compared
to VECC, LOT-ECC with coalescing reduces average
memory latency by almost 11% in 7500-based systems,
and 54% in 5500-based systems. Additionally, LOT-
ECC allows the channel to operate without saturating
even under substantially higher traffic rates.
4.4 Positive Impact on System Design
LOT-ECC imposes few restrictions on the choice
of DRAM parts, DIMM layout, DDR protocol, burst
length, etc. In fact, with larger DRAM parts such as
x16 or x32, the size of the data segment on each chip
increases, and it is often more efficient to build strong
error detection codes over larger data words. It is as
yet unclear what DIMM configurations the memory in-
dustry will adopt with x16 or x32 chips, and LOT-ECC
can work well in any case Additionally, LOT-ECC re-
quires absolutely no modification to the DRAM parts
or interface. It only requires support from the memory
controller (data mapping and interpreting bits as either
data, LED, or GEC) and system firmware (to reduce
the amount of memory space visible to the OS to ac-
commodate GEC). These are relatively more amenable
to change [16], and require the participation of fewer
design teams, removing a few hurdles for commercial
adoption. Another consideration is that Galois field
arithmetic over 16-bit or 32-bit symbols (required with
the switch to x16 or x32 parts) can get complicated to
implement [27, 36], increasing complexity, latency, and
energy consumption. LOT-ECC utilizes simple addi-
tive checksums and parity calculations to provide strong
fault tolerance, reducing the required design effort, and
saving a small amount of power.
4.5 Storage Overhead
The price LOT-ECC pays to achieve excellent power,
performance, and complexity characteristics is a small
increase in storage overhead. Conventional schemes
spread data across a large number of DRAMs, keeping
ECC overhead at 12.5%. LOT-ECC utilizes this space to
store the LED, and requires a further 14% storage area
for GEC. However, since only cheap commodity mem-
ory is used, this will likely be a price that server vendors
will be willing to pay [16]. Additionally, overall TCO is
reduced due to the substantial energy savings.
5 Conclusions
The power, performance, storage, and complexity
overheads of providing strong levels of fault-tolerance
are already very significant. Various trends in mem-
ory system design such as increasing burst length, wider
I/O DRAM chips, increasing contribution of memory
to system-level power/performance, larger memory ca-
pacities, greater need for parallelism, and less reli-
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able hardware will exacerbate this problem. There is
a need to fundamentally rethink memory error protec-
tion in a manner that is cognizant of these trends and
improves efficiency. We present LOT-ECC, a novel
chipkill-level reliability mechanism that employs sim-
ple multi-tiered checksum and parity fields that effec-
tively address various DRAM failure modes. It enables
the use of minimally-sized ranks of x8 DRAMs, re-
ducing energy consumption by up to 44.8% and aver-
age memory access latency by up to 46.9%, while si-
multaneously simplifying implementation. Moreover, it
achieves these benefits without affecting the design of
commodity memory DIMMs or channels, and is also
transparent to other system components such as the OS
and caches. It pays for all these advantages through a
small increase in storage overhead, considered an ac-
ceptable cost in the memory industry as long as com-
modity DRAMs are used.
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